Tag Archives: UIT

Loss Recovery from H. Beck

Investors with H. Beck may have grounds for recovery for investment losses in ETFs and other investments.

H. Beck recently consented to a settlement with regulators.  The settlement stated that from at least July 2008 until June 2013, H. Beck failed to properly supervise the sale of nontraditional ETFs and failed to properly supervise the recommendations made by its financial advisors. As a result, H. Beck violated NASD Rules 2310, 3010(a) through (b), and 2110, and FINRA Rules 2111, 3110(a)-(b), and 2010.

Between 2008 and 2011, H. Beck’s financial advisor James Dresselaers recommended to the Firm’s customer, EB, investments in several nontraditional exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”) and stocks issued by companies in the metals and mining sector. These recommendations were unsuitable for EB, a professional athlete with no investment experience, a moderate risk tolerance, and an investment objective of long-term growth. EB suffered losses of more than $1.1 million on these investments.

NASD Rule 3010(a)-(b) and FINRA Rule 3110(a)-(b) require every investment brokerage to establish and maintain a system and procedures to supervise the activities of its financial advisors that is reasonably designed to achieve compliance with securities laws and regulations and applicable NASD/FINRA rules.

FINRA rules require that financial advisors only recommend investments to suitable investors.  So if an investment poses too much risk, or possesses other characteristics that are inconsistent with the wants and needs of the investor, it is a violation to recommend that investment to such an investor.  This is commonly referred to as a “suitability” violation.

This is not the first time H. Beck has been penalized by regulators over non-traditional investments.  In March 2015, H. Beck was censured and fined $425,000 for failing to properly supervise the sale of unit investment trusts (UITs), failing to properly supervise the preparation of account reports sent to investors, and failing to enforce its own written supervisory procedures relating to financial advisors’ outside email accounts, which is a significant protection against fraud. Dresselaers also has a history of customer disputes.   This is concerning since Dresselaers is listed as the top executive at H. Beck.

Such regulatory findings and prior disputes evidence wide-spread supervisory problems at H. Beck and support private claims by investors.

Glenn Robert King investment losses

Over the course of his career, New Jersey broker Glenn Robert King, most recently of Royal Alliance and Buckman, Buckman and Reid,  has been accused many times of inappropriate action leading to investment loss of his investors.  His record discloses 25 disclosure events.  Disclosure events can be either lawsuits/judgments, terminations, regulatory investigations, bankruptcies, or written investor complaints seeking recovery.  His employers had a duty to provide heightened supervision to King in light of this extensive history but apparently failed to supervise adequately.  Investors may call for a free and confidential consultation with a private attorney by calling 1-866-817-0201.

A FINRA Hearing Officer in the most recent action found that King: 1) willfully misrepresented and omitted material facts, which constitutes fraud, when he sold 44 unit investment trusts (“UITs”) to seven customers; 2) excessively traded the accounts of four customers when he traded the customers’ UITs and closed-end mutual funds (“CEFs”) on a short-term basis (a suitability violation because the expense and commissions of trading were more than the reasonable benefit to the investor of such trades ); 3) made unsuitable recommendations to the same four investors when he recommended that they purchase UITs and CEFs as short-term trading investments; and 4) exercised discretion in the accounts of the four customers without written consent or approval. The Hearing Officer barred King for the fraud and imposed an additional bar on him for the suitability violations. In light of the bars, the Hearing Officer declined to impose sanctions on King for the improper exercise of discretion.

After an independent review of the record, FINRA affirmed the Hearing Officer’s findings of liability of King for the excessive trading and improper exercise of discretion in investor accounts, but we reverse the Hearing Officer’s findings of liability related to the fraud and unsuitable recommendations. For sanctions, FINRA decided to bar King for excessive trading in his investors’ accounts. In light of this bar, FINRA declined to impose sanctions on King for his improper discretionary trading.

In February 1992, Glenn Robert King registered with FINRA as a securities broker.  During the periods relevant to the conduct for the most recent allegations, April 2008 to March 2011 and January 2013 to December 2014, King was registered with Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. (“Royal Alliance”) and Buckman, Buckman & Reid, Inc. (“Buckman Reid”), respectively. King joined Royal Alliance as a broker in January 2005. He voluntarily terminated his association with the firm in June 2011. In January 2012, King registered with Buckman Reid as general securities representative. King voluntarily left Buckman Reid in June 2015. King has not registered with another FINRA member firm since he terminated his association with Buckman Reid.

 

Investigation of Harold Stephen Pomeranz

Invest photo 2Harold Stephen Pomeranz of Stifel Nicolaus of New York entered into a regulatory settlement with FINRA regulators to settle charges against him.  Though Pomeranz neither admitted or denied fault, FINRA asserted the following factual findings and assessed a deferred fine of $5,000 and suspended from association with any FINRA member in any capacity for three months.

Pomeranz consented to the sanctions and to the entry of findings that he
recommended a number of unsuitable short-term unit investment trust (UIT) transactions
in an elderly customer’s account. The findings stated that the UITs Pomeranz recommended
to the customer had maturity dates of 24 months, and carried initial sales charges ranging
from approximately 2.5 percent to 3.95 percent. Yet the average holding period for the UITs Pomeranz recommended was less than 14 months. Moreover, on numerous occasions,
Pomeranz recommended that the customer use the proceeds from the short-term sale
of a UIT to purchase another UIT with similar or even identical investment objectives.
Pomeranz’s recommendations to purchase and sell UITs on a short-term basis caused the
customer to incur unnecessary sales charges and were unsuitable in view of the frequency,
size and cost of the transactions.

Securities brokers are not allowed to charge commissions and costs that are excessive in relation to the average equity in the portfolio.  So when a broker makes trades in products that have costs of 3 to 4% it only takes a few before those trades become excessive and in violation of the duties owed the investor.

Attention Investors of Jeffrey Dragon

FINRA alleges that over a two-year period, Jeffrey Dragon, a registered representative of Berthel Fisher & Co. Financial Services. Inc., generated more than $421,000 in concessions for himself and his firm. at the expense of his customers, by recommending and effecting a pattern of unsuitable short-term trading of unit investment trusts ( UITs ).

Invest photo 2Specifically, between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2014 (the ‘UIT Period’ ) Dragon recommended to 12 customers – many of whom were seniors, unsophisticated investors, or both – that they liquidate UIT positions that they had held for only a few months, and which they had purchased on Dragon s recommendations, and then use the proceeds to purchase other UITs. Because each UIT purchased carried a new sales load, and because UITs are designed not to be actively traded, Dragon s recommendations were excessive and unsuitable.

Dragon’s recommendations to these customers were further unsuitable. in that he designed his recommendations to prevent his customers’ UIT purchases from qualifying for sales-charge discounts. Despite regularly recommending that customers purchase UITs in amounts that exceeded volume-discount “breakpoints” of $50,000 and $100.000. Dragon routinely structured their investments – by spreading the amounts over smaller purchases and multiple days – in order to avoid reaching those thresholds. By doing so. Dragon sought to increase his concessions at his customers’ expense.

Berthel allowed this activity to occur – and. in fact, profited from it – as a direct result of its inadequate system for supervising UIT trading. Throughout the UlT Period. Berthei’s only regular supervisory review of UIT recommendations and customer activity consisted of manual reviews of daily trade blotters that did not indicate either how long UIT positions had been held before liquidation or the source of funds used to purchase new UITs. Thus, Berthel’s supervisory system was not reasonably designed to prevent short-tenn and potentially excessive UIT trading.

Berthel’s supervisory system was also inadequate because it was not reasonably designed to prevent short-term and potentially excessive trading in mutual funds. As with UlTs. the firm’s supervisory system lacked any methods, reports, or other tools to identify mutual-fund switching or trading patterns indicative of other misconduct between January 1. 2013 and December 31, 2015 (the ‘ Mutual Fund Period’ ).

Likewise, Berthel’s supervisory system was not reasonably designed to censure that the firm’s UIT and mutual-fund customers received all sales-charge discounts to which they were entitled during the UIT Period and Mutual Fund Period, respectively. Instead. Berthel relied 2 on its registered representatives and its clearing firm to determine whether UIT and mutual-fund purchases should receive sales-charge discounts, and conducted no review or supension to determine i f those discounts were applied correctly.

This not only allowed Dragon s breakpoint-manipulation scheme to go unchecked, it also resulted in further injury to Berthel s customers: from 2010 through 2014, Berthel failed to detect that more than 2,700 of its customers’ UIT purchases did not receive applicable sales-charge discounts. As a result, Berthel customers paid excessive sales charges of approximately $667.000, nearly all of which was paid to Berthel and its registered representatives as dealer concessions.